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BIO-PIRACY: CREATING PROPRIETARY
RIGHTS IN PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES
James 0. Odek*
Since the Age of Exploration, researchers and travellers have
transported discovered plant species back to their own countries as
new foods and raw materials for plant breeding. During expeditions to conquer and subjugate most of the developing countries,
explorers screened agricultural materials for new and useful crops.
The Great Columbian Exchange brought the tomato to Italian
cuisine and introduced the potato to Ireland.' The Royal Botanical
Gardens at Kew benefited beyond measure from British travellers
and colonialists in South America; indeed, the majesty of Britain as
a colonial power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was
arguably due to the pre-eminence of the gardens. "[Clontrol over
plants often meant much wealth and power."2 The concept that
exotic plant species found in nature were freely accessible to the
taker commenced during this epoch.'
Presently, developing countries are passionately protesting that
scientists from multinational corporations are prospecting for plant
species in their tropical forests, protecting discoveries through
breeders' rights, and merchandising the plants back to them at
exorbitant prices." To developing countries, these practices
constitute uncompensated exploitation of their "plant genetic
resources" in the name of intellectual property rights. The
increasing importance of plant biotechnology as a determinant of
international competitiveness has fostered a challenge to the

* Lecturer of Public Law, University of Nairobi, Kenya; Advocate, High Court of Kenya;
LL.B., 1987, University of Nairobi; Diploma of Law, 1988, Kenya School of Law; LL.M., 1989,
Yale Law School; S.J.D. Candidate, University of Toronto.
1
Rebecca L Margulies, Note, ProtectingBiodiversity: Recognizing InternationalIntellectual PropertyRights in Plant Genetic Resources, 14 MICIL J. INTL L 322, 328 (1993).
2LAWRENCE BUSCH ET AL., PLANTS POWER, AND PROFIT. SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND
ETHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW BITECHNOLOGIES 59 (1991).
3 Margulies, aupra note 1, at 328.
4 See CALEISrous JuiA, THE GENE HUNTERS: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE SCRAMBLE FOR
SEEDS 169-170 (1989) (observing that industrialized nations collect and 'improve Third

World resources before selling such resources back at high prices).
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concept of free access to plant genetic resources by developing
countries.
An analysis of plant breeders' rights is incomplete without
scrutiny of the ownership and legal status of the plant genetic
resources crucial to the sustenance of plant biotechnology. Yet an
inquiry into ownership is deficient without a discussion of the issue
of dominion over plant germplasm in gene banks. As a corollary to
this issue, questions of compensation, access, and genetic bio-piracy
become germane.
At the heart of these issues lie two equitable considerations.
The first consideration is whether developing countries should pay
for new plant varieties developed by Western seed companies from
species obtained from the Third World. 5 The second factor is
whether plant genetic resources should be commodities, and if so,
who should have proprietary rights?
This Article offers an analysis of these issues and addresses the
following issues: (1) the nature of plant genetic resources; (2) the
significance of these resources; (3) the role the concept of a
"common heritage of mankind" plays in justifying the uncompensated extraction of plant genetic resources; (4) the extent to which
developing countries stand to gain from making elite plant genetic
resources subject to a concept of a common heritage of mankind; (5)
the cases for and against commoditization of plant genetic resources; (6) the resolution of the question of ownership of plant genetic
resources; (7) the extent to which the Biodiversity Convention and
Agenda 21 address ownership of plant genetic resources; (8)
possible proposals to resolve the legal status of plant genetic
resources; and (9) entities in which proprietary rights over plant
genetic resources could be vested.

I. SIGNIFICANCE OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES
Scientifically, the term "plant genetic resources" refers "to the
genetic information found in the chromosomes of the nucleus and

5 See Bill Paul, Third World Battles for Fruit of Its Seed Stocks, WALL ST. J., June 15,
1984, at 34 (characterizing dispute between developing countries and Western seed
companies as 'seed wars").
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associated subcellular structures of plants;" the chemical chromosomal information carried in gene alleles of living plant cells.7
This genetic material is found in every living cell of every plant.
Plant genetic resources include genetic material from "all agricultural crops, fruit, nut and forest trees, forage crops, medicinal and
ornamental plants, unexploited plants, wild relatives and ecosystem
diversity."' These resources are divided into primary, secondary
and tertiary gene pools.9
The economic significance of these resources exists in their
potential value to industry, medicine,10 agriculture, and energy
development." In medicine, for instance, the rosy periwinkle of
Madagascar has yielded two compounds used to treat Hodgkin's
disease and juvenile leukemia successfully.'
A vine, Ancistro
cladus korupensis, with enormous potential for treatment of AIDS,
has been found in the Korup forest of Cameroon."3 In agriculture,
scientists expect genetic engineering to increase efficiency and
productivity and to improve the nutritional quality of food.14 The
development of insect-resistant crops, through agricultural
biotechnology, may minimize dependence on chemical pesticides."
These genetic resources make significant contributions to climate
6 H. Garrison Wilkes, Plant Genetic Resources Over Ten Thousand Years: From a
Handfulof Seed to the Crop-SpecificMega-Genebanks,in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE
AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 67, 79 (Jack R. Kloppenburg Jr. ed., 1988).
'See id. (discussing early use of "specimen' plants).
8KEYSTONE CENTER, FINAL CONSENSUS REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE SERIES
ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES, MADRAS PLENARY SESSION 8 (1990) [hereinafter KEYSTONE
CENTER, MADRAS SESSION].
' Primary resources denote the commercial cultivars, both obsolete, current and newly
developed; secondary resources denote folk (indigenous) varieties; tertiary resources denote
the wild and weedy plant varieties. Id.
'0See Margulies, supra note 1, at 325 (noting that, of drugs sold in the United States
since the 1960s, 25 percent derived from plant sources).
" See David E. Bell, The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity: The Continuing
Significanceof U.S Objections at the Earth Summit, 26 GEo. WASH. J. INVL L. & ECON. 479,
484 (1993) (discussing value of species diversity).
Birds and Bees, ECONOMIST, May 10, 1992, at 15, 17.
'3AIDS, NEW AFRICAN, January, 1994, at 22.
" See Karen G. Hermann, Issues in the Regulation of BioengineeredFood, 7 HIGH TCH.
LJ. 107,109-11 (1993) (noting examples of antisense tomato which is less prone to bruising
and canola oil containing higher percentage of unsaturated fatty acids).
' Karen A. Goldman, Note, Compensationfor Use of Biological Resources Under the
Conventionon BiologicalDiversity: Compatibilit ofConservationMeasures and Competitiveness of the Biotechnology Industry, 25 LAw & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 695, 703 (1994).
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stabilization, watershed and soil protection, and maintenance of the
earth's chemical balance."' Bioremediation, the use of specialized
organisms to clean up pollution or environmental waste, is another
area in
which plant genetic resources can help protect the environ17
ment.
Of the vast number of plant species in existence, it is probable
that only a small percentage have been identified, and of those
identified, relatively few plant species have been studied in
depth."s In monetary terms, these resources make immense
contributions to economies of developed countries. For example, in
the United States plant genetic resources from developing countries
contribute $500 million per year to the wheat crop. 9
Because of plant genetic resources' significance, both developed
and developing countries have shown concern over their control.
This attention has increased as the public and private sectors,
principally in the developed countries,20 have pursued heavily
funded bio-technological research programs.2 1 To developing
countries, the escalating flow of genetic material and information
from the gene-rich but technology-poor countries of the South to the
gene-poor but technology-rich countries of the North has heightened
the interest in these resources. In recent years, developing
countries have realized that the capacity to utilize and manipulate
plants' genetic information is an important factor in international
competitiveness.' Consequently, ownership and control of these
resources is becoming a critical element of developing countries'
trade policies.

1U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAME, BIODIVEsrry COUNTRY STUDIES:

SYNTHESIS REPORT,

at 1,17U.N. Doc. Country Studies/Inf. 1 (1992).
1d.
Norman Myers, Genetic Resources in Jeopardy, 13 AMBIO 171 (1984).
ALBERT SASSON, BIOTECHNOLOGIES AND DEVELOPMENT, UNESCO, TECHNICAL CENTRE
FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL COOPERATION 296 (1988); PAT R. MOONEY, THE LAW OF THE
SEED-AN INTRODUCTION 77-78 (1984).
20 See BUSCH ET AL., supra note 2, at 17-20 (tracing commercial developments in
biotechnology).
21 KEYSTONE CENTER, FINAL CONSENSUS REPORT: GLOBAL INITIATIVE FOR THE SECURITY
AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF PLANT GENErIC RESOURCES, OSLO PLENARY SESSION 11 (1991)
[hereinafter KEYSTONE CENTER, OSLO SESSION].
22

JACK R. KLOPPENBURG JR., FIRST THE SEED 152 (1988).
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II. BIo-PIRACY AND UNCOMPENSATED EXTRACTION OF
PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES

Plant genetic resources from developing countries have largely
been appropriated without compensation.2
Most developing
countries have characterized this uni-directional and uncompensated appropriation as "bio-piracy." Piracy, however, is a nebulous
expression lacking a precise legal definition." Because international law has not defined the uncompensated extraction of plant
genetic resources as piracy, the characterization of such acts as
piracy serves as a normative assertion by developing countries that
they have an entitlement to their plant genetic resources.2
In the contemporary era, discrete examples from Africa 2 and
India illustrate the uncompensated extraction of plant genetic
resources from developing countries. Roy Laishley observed:
[Kenya] is bringing in tropical legume seeds developed in Australia which were based on indigenous
Kenya seeds. Therefore at least a portion of Kenya's
new grass and legume seeds have been commercially
imported at some cost to the country. However,
there is no record of Kenya having received any
payment for the raw material ...

which developed

the new varieties.27
Erna Bennett of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of

' See Jack R. Kloppenburg Jr. & Daniel L. Kleinman, Seeds of Controversy: National
PropertyVersus Common Heritage, in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF
PukNr GENETIC RESOURCES 171, 173 (Jack R. Kloppenburg Jr. ed., 1988) (setting forth
framework for achieving "global plant genetic interdependence').

"'In the broadest sense, [piracy] can signify any unauthorized and uncompensated
reproduction or simulation of a creative intellectual product that deprives the originator of
the economic or moral benefits accruing from his or her creative undertaking.* J. H.
Reichman, IntellectualProperty in InternationalTrade: Opportunitiesand Risks ofa GATT
Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 775 (1989).
"In positive international law, piracy is a term for robbery committed on the high seas
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any state. In re Piracy Jure Gentium [1934] App. Cas.

586, 589.
" See Richard Stone, The Biodiversity Treaty: Pandora'sBox or FairDeal?,256 SCIENCE
1624, 1624 (1992) (citing example of rosy periwinkle from Madagascar).
27 MOONEY, supra note 19, at 30.
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the United Nations narrated a similar account of an uncompensated extraction of plant genetic resources from Libya, where forage
seed has been exported free of charge to Australia and has been
reimported, in a slightly different form, at commercial prices.'
Another example of uncompensated extraction of plant genetic
resources from Africa involves the Endod (Phytolacca dodecandra)
tree, commonly known as the African soapberry plant. This plant
is a perennial that has been cultivated for centuries in Africa,
particularly in Ethiopia, where it is used as a laundry soap and
shampoo. In 1990, the University of Toledo applied for a patent on
the use of Endod to control Zebra mussels.2 9 Royalties from this
patent, however, will not go to the plant's original "proprietors," the
Ethiopian people, who selected, nurtured and preserved Endod for
centuries.o
A similar story involves the neem tree and its products, used for
centuries in India as a biopesticide and medicine."1 In developed
countries, neem-based products for medicine and bio-insecticides
are currently patented, but the Indian growers of the neem tree
have not received any royalties for protecting and conserving this
tree.3 2
Another case of uncompensated extraction includes the Monellin
and Thaumatin plants. African farmers have used these plants as
sweeteners and flavor enhancers for centuries. The United States,
which has issued patents for products of these plants, contains a
$900 million per year market for low-calorie sweeteners, but the
African farmers who have preserved this plant are not the holders

= Id.
This patent raises the issue of second use. Suppose a product is already known for one
biological application, but a different biological utility is discovered. Is the second use
patentable? Under European laws, a patent can issue for the second use. See, eg., R.S.
CRESPI, PATENT: A BASIC GUIDE TO PATENTING IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 65 (1988) (providing
example of second use" in treatment of senility with drug nimodipin).
See Endod: A Case Study of the Use of African Indigenous Knowledge to Address
Global Health and Environmental Problems, RAFI COMMUNQUE, (Rural Advancement
Found. Intl, Ottawa, Ontario), Mar. 1993, at 1 (explaining Ethiopians' use of endod).
2

81 VANDANA SHIVA, MONOCULTURES OF THE MIND: UNDERSTANDNG THE THREATS TO
BIOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL DrEriY 7, 18 (1993).

'AId. (describing traditional Indian use of neem and uncompensated extraction of neem
by Western companies).
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of the patent.' Finally, Eli Lilly and Co. has made millions of
dollars on the sale of the anticancer drugs vinblastine and vincristine, extracted from the rosy periwinkle plant, without any
compensation to Madagascar, its country of origin."
These examples of uncompensated extraction of plant genetic
resources raise a fundamental issue regarding "secondary use" of
a product. Using the Endod case as an illustration, what argument
supports the Ethiopian rights against the patenting of Endod by
the University of Toledo? If one adopts a European, individualistic
concept of patent property, the Ethiopian people have little chance
of invalidating the Endod patent. Under European patent laws, the
Endod case involves a new use of an old product. The University
of Toledo would probably argue that the Endod patent does not
involve a use analogous to the Ethiopians' use of Endod as a soap
and shampoo. Thus, the Endod patent is valid because a patent for
a new use of a known substance is supportable if the new use
involves practical difficulties which the patentee has been the first
to see and overcome by his own ingenuity.'
The inventiveness of the Endod patent-the idea of using Endod
to control Zebra mussels-further weakens the Ethiopian case. As
Justice Graham stated in Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v Biorex
Ltd.:36
[T]he invention may lie in the idea of taking the step
in question. Why should anyone want to take this
step unless he had first appreciated that such a step
might give him a useful product?.... [Ilt is in my
judgement not obvious to take the step in question
unless and until it has been conceived that the idea
of doing so might lead to a useful result."7
Scientists from Lucky Biotech and the University of California received U.S. Patent No.
5,234,834 for all fruit, seeds and vegetables genetically engineered to contain super-sweet
natural proteins from monellin and thaumatin (Thaumatococcus danieliii). U.S. Patents
Awarded on Materials Derived from African Plants: Monellin and Thaumatin, RAFI
COMMUNIQUE, (Rural Advancement Found. Intl, Ottawa, Ontario), Dec. 1993, at 2.
" Goldman, supra note 15, at 717 (citation omitted).
3
5 DOUGLAS FALCONER gr AL., TERRELL ON THE LAW OF PATENTS § 316, at 129 (12th ed.
1971).
w 1970 R.P.D. & T.M. 157 (Eng. Ch.).
'" Id. at 192.
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This requirement of an "inventive step" is disadvantageous to
developing countries. It affords little leeway in which developing
countries can make their claims.' Moreover, "[niative people face
a legal system that divides the world up in a fashion both foreign
and hostile to their sense of felt need."" At almost every level, a
developing country's claims fall outside the parameters of western
legal discourse. 40
What facilitates the uncompensated extraction of plant genetic
resources? The international classification of such resources as
part of a "common heritage of mankind," a universal resource
immune to private property claims, expedites the uncompensated
removal of plant genetic resources. 41 Any material falling in this
category is in the international public domain. Subject to the costs
of collection, the materials in this domain are freely accessible.
The International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties
of Plants (UPOV Convention) endorses the treatment of plant
genetic resources as part of a common heritage. Under the UPOV
Convention, breeder's rights accrue whatever the origin, "artificial
or natural," of the initial variation from which the variety was
derived.42 By using the term "natural," the UPOV Convention
adopts this concept of a common heritage of mankind.
Developing countries object to the classification of their plant
genetic resources as a common heritage. Norah Olembo has noted
that:

"Cf. Rosemary J. Coombe, The Propertiesof Culture and the Politics of Possessing
Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy, 6 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 249, 268-269 (1993) (arguing that law is not coterminous with assertions of
cultural presence).

Id. at 269 (citation omitted).
"Id. (emphasizing demarcation between 'ideas and expressions, oral traditions and
written forms").
4

The common heritage principle has "gained universal acceptance in areas, such as the
deep sea-bed, the lunar surface, Antarctica, which fall outside of the jurisdiction of any one
state and not yet subject to extensive exploitation." Margulies, supranote 1, at 330; see also

Simone Bilderbeek, The Common Heritage Principleand the World Heritage Principle, in
BIODIVERSITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Simone Bilderbeek ed., 1992) (attributing first
articulation of principle to Argentine ambassador to the United Nations during negotiations
on lunar surface).

"International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961,
art. 6, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 112.
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The concept of free access to genetic material is
noble, and in the past, has assisted developing
countries to acquire materials from the CGIAR
centers for their food programs. But what will
happen if plant material is obtained by a developed
country company from the CGLAR centers, is genetically improved, and then protected through patents?
This protected, modified form of plant material
would then be accessible to the original country at a
cost. So what went out free, would return with a
price tag....'

Disapproval of a common heritage and free access is echoed by
Vandana Shiva, who contends that ideas from developing countries
travel freely to developed countries, while "[ildeas from the
North-even when originally derived from indigenous knowledge of
the Third World farmers and herbalists-are protected by [i]ntellectual [p]roperty [r]ights." 4
Conceptually, the uncompensated extraction and subsequent
patenting of plant biotechnological products from developing
countries means that these resources become commoditized and
sold as new and improved varieties to these countries. In this
process of commoditization, these resources enjoy a unique
distinction. They are considered a common heritage of mankind,
humanity's collective genetic estate, available as a free good
subject to the expenses of collection." This approach leaves plant
genetic resources in a jurisprudential void, unprotected by private
property rights and freely accessible to all." This free access is
a source of international dispute.

" InternationalExperts Debate Patents and Biodiversity Issues, CGIAR HIGHLIGHTS,
(CGIAR, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 1994, at 4.
SIVA, supra note 31, at 12-13.
Angus J. Wells, PatentingNew Life Forms: An EcologicalPerspective, 3 Etm. INTELL
PRoP. REv. 111, 114 (1994).
4 KLOPPENBURG, supra note 22, at 166.

41 But see Margulies, supra note 1, at 331 (characterizing efforts to deny private property

rights in plant germplasm as "doomed from the start").
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III. ACCESS TO PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES
Developing countries contend that unfettered access to their
plant genetic resources by developing countries is tantamount to
exploitation." They insist that if their plant genetic resources are
part of a common heritage of mankind, then all elite commercial
varieties derived from these resources in developed countries
should be similarly classified. 49 This argument amounts to a
demand for the de-commoditization of elite commercial varieties.'
The FAO's International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources
(FAO Undertaking), 1 based upon the principle that plant genetic
resources are a common heritage of mankind which includes both
elite and current breeders' lines of plant species, embraces this
demand. 2
Developed countries have rejected the inclusion of elite plant
species in a common heritage of mankind. These countries have
expressed reservations about provisions that threaten breeders'
rights.'
As a result of relentless lobbying from developed
countries, succeeding FAO Conferences have reversed the inclusion
of elite species in a common heritage." In two resolutions that
are now annexed to the FAO Undertaking, the FAO recognized that
plant breeders' rights are not incompatible with the Undertak8
ing. 5
It is pertinent to question the extent to which developing
countries stand to benefit from the categorization of elite plant
genetic resources as part of a common heritage of mankind.
Developing countries would gain to the extent that such a classifi-

" Gerald Dworkin, The Plant Varieties Act, 1983, EUR. INTEIL. PROP. REV., 270, 272
(1983).
" KLOPPENBURG, supra note 22, at 172.

5o Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 23, at 174.
" International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF
FAO, at 1 71-75, U.N. Doc. C84/REP (1983) [hereinafter FAO Undertaking].
"Id.; Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 23, at 174.
"Kloppenburg
& Klainman, supra note 23, at 191 (citing example of U.S. State
Department's claim that FAO Undertaking precluded by domestic legislation recognizing
plant breeders' rights).
"KEYSTONE CENTER, OSLO SESSION, supra note 21, at 9 (observing that resolutions
recognize that FAO Undertaking not incompatible with plant breeders' rights).
wFAO Undertaking, supra note 51, at 72.
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cation would ensure free access to improved plant varieties which
were previously available only upon payment of royalties. This
classification would place both developed and developing countries
on a formally even footing.
However, formal "equality of access " " does not entail equivalence in the distribution of benefits between developed and
developing countries. Developed countries propagate elite plant
varieties for application in intensive agricultural production
systems supported by capital and other inputs.51 These sophisticated varieties are often designed by industrialized nations that can
meet the energy-intensive demands of this type of agriculture.'
These technologically refined seeds are simply ill-suited to the
needs of most developing countries."9 Consequently, free access
to improved varieties does not necessarily enable developing
countries to productively use these varieties.
In addition, given their geopolitical power, multinational seed
companies are unlikely to dismantle the institutional arrangements
which provide private proprietary rights in improved plant genetic
resources. These corporations will seek to perpetuate these
rights.'o Thus, developing countries may encounter obstacles in
extending the concept of a common heritage to elite plant varieties.
Although the developing countries hold a position that is tenable
in equity, their demands are misplaced. The real difficulty facing
developing countries is not access to plant genetic resources--these
resources are in large supply in their backyards. The problem is
establishing control and utilizing these resources. Genuine control
of genetic resources lies in knowing exactly what the resources are,
and how they can be manipulated. 1 It is in these areas that
developing countries lack adequate control, and it is in these areas
that their efforts should be directed. 2 Otherwise, uncompensated

Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 23, at 192.
'7

See generally id. at 193-94 (contending that access to South's genetic resources not

adequately compensated by access to developed gene lines of little value to South).
"Margulies, supra note 1, at 331.
g Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 23, at 192.

0ld.
61
Id. at 194, 198.
6 See id. at 198 (acknowledging that developing countries must master their genetic
resources if institutional mechanisms such as international plant gene fund are to succeed).
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germplasm extraction will continue because "[t]he real issue that
is never addressed is the role of scientific ignorance as the necessary and sufficient condition for the exploitative appropriation of
the plant genetic resources' of the Southern countries.
The issue is not ownership of the gene but possession of the
technology to utilize genes in a particular environment. On this
matter, Garrison Wilkes contends that "the fundamental cause of
concern about who owns the plant genetic resources is the developing nations' lack of capability with regard to plant breeding and the
new biotechnologies which might permit them to offset the power
of transnational seed companies and institutional support for plant
breeders' rights.' 4 Unless the gene-rich but technology-poor
developing countries begin to consider basic and applied biological
research as an essential development goal, they shall continue to
relinquish their botanic genetic resources to the gene-poor but
technology-rich developed countries.'
Developed and developing countries have conflicting perspectives
on access and ownership of plant genetic resources. This conflict
has given rise to the phenomenon known as the "seed wars.'
At
the heart of these wars lies the equitable question of whether
developing countries should pay for new seed varieties developed
by Western seed companies from seeds obtained in the Third
World. 7 The cases for and against payment by the developing
countries are equivalent to the cases for and against commoditization of plant genetic resources. Similar arguments address the
question of whether plant genetic resources ought to continue as a
common heritage of mankind. These arguments strike at the heart
of the concept of property, particularly Locke's labor theory of
property.
63

Daniel J. Goldstein, MolecularBiology and the Protectionof Germplasm: A Matterof
National Security, in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC
RESOURCES 315, 318 (Jack R. Kloppenburg Jr. ed., 1988).
Wilkes, supra note 6, at 87.
Some developed countries insist that all basic science is an expensive luxury, and
therefore have successfully insisted that developing countries avoid basic research. Cf
BUSCH ET AL., supra note 2, at 183 (pointing out that few developing countries have "critical
mass of scientists required for genetic engineering research).
e Neil D. Hamilton, Who Owns Dinner: Evolving Legal Mechanisms for Ownership of
Plant Genetic Resources, 28 TULSA L.J. 601, 602 (1993).
7 Paul, supra note 5, at 34.
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Developed countries advance three arguments against commodization of plant genetic resources and in support of a common
heritage concept.S Such arguments implicitly rely on the Lockean
labor theory of property."9 Focusing primarily on maintaining
access to undeveloped plant genetic resources and shielding the
grant of intellectual property rights in technology, these arguments
hypothesize that to make it worthwhile for enterprises to develop
new plant varieties, a solid plant breeders' regime is indispensable.
These arguments must be critically appraised.
Developed countries argue that plant genetic resources intermittently contain valuable genes. Until a particular accession is
evaluated and its traits identified, the resources it contains are of
an unknown value. ' For example, a representative of one leading
American seed company has stated that "raw germplasm only
becomes valuable after considerable investment of time and money,
both in adapting exotic germplasm for use by applied plant
breeders and in incorporating the germplasm into varieties useful
to farmers."71
This argument contains three flaws. First, as Robert Nozick
asks, why should a person gain what he mixes with his labor
instead of losing his labor?7 2 In the context of plant genetic
resources, why should developed countries gain the entire proprietary right to a new variety by mixing their intellect with plant
genetic resources from developing countries? Why should developing countries lose their genetic resources? No philosophical
reasoning justifies developed countries gaining the "whole" by
mixing their labor with a significant "part" supplied by developing
" William A. Stiles Jr., A CongressionalView on ProprietaryRights, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH PLANTS 35, 44 (American Soc'y of Agronomy No. 52,
1989) (observing that many developed countries contend germplasm resources' value

attributable to scientific improvement).
* Locke, in his treatise on government, formulated the labor theory of property. To enjoy
goods, an individual must exert labor upon them. This labor adds value to the goods. The
'value" added by the individual bestows property rights upon the laborer. JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 208-09 (Peter Lalett ed., student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698).
" See Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 23, at 189 (remarking on delay inherent in
identifying value of plant accessions).
71

Id. (quoting PIONEER HI-BRED INL, INC., CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF EXOTIC
GERMPLASM TO IMPROVE VARIETIES 47 (1984)).
?2See ROBERT NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 175 (1974) (discussing Locke's labor
theory of property in context of entitlement theory).
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countries.
Second, the fact that a plant genetic resource is of unknown
utility does not mean its value is so minimal that it should be
appropriated freely. Ignorance of an item's value at a specific
moment in time provides no justification for appropriating it when
its value later becomes manifest.
Third, Locke's labor theory of property does not support the
developed countries' reasoning because plant genetic resources from
developing countries are not simple products of nature. Generations have expended labor in improving these plant genetic
resources.7" Locke's theory does not preclude proprietary rights
to these resources because there is no minimum quantum of labor
required to acquire proprietary rights.7 4 Domesticated plant
varieties frequently vary dramatically in form from their wild or
weedy relations.7" As one scholar notes, "the total genetic change
achieved by farmers over the millennia was far greater than that
achieved by the last hundred
or two years of the more systematic
76
science-based effort."

Developed countries contend that the labor expended in preserving and nurturing plant genetic resources by developing countries
does not complete the development of these resources. In their dayto-day agricultural activities, contemporary developing country
farmers constantly produce and refine the genetic diversity that is
the modern plant breeders' raw material." The germplasm of
See BUSCH ET AL., supra note 2, at 58-59 (discussing role of farmers in plant selection).
T, Locke's theory is inconclusive when applied to plant genetic resources. The theory
advocates an entitlement to property; it does not rationalize entitlement to property rights.
To be entitled to something presupposes that all evidence weighed, an individual has a better
claim than the rest of the world, and hence, proprietary rights. See STEPHEN R. MuNzER,
A THEORY OF PROPERTY 260 (1990) (arguing absence of competing moral claim is necessary
condition of laborer's property rights). Locke's theory only indicates that the breeders of elite
plants may be more deserving of rights than developing countries. It does not demonstrate
that developing countries do not deserve property rights on some other basis, such as group
labor, ancestral trust or cultural property.
7
' See generally George C. Coggins & Anne F. Harris, The Greeningof American Law?:
The Recent Evolution of FederalLaw for PreservingFloral Diversity, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J.
247 (1987) (arguing for protection of not only cultivated plants but also uncultivated
counterparts and habitat).
76

NORMAN W. SIMMONDS, PRINCIPLES OF CROP IMPROvM:ENr 11 (1979).
" See KEYSTONE CENTER, OSLO SESSION, supra note 21, at 13 (emphasizing importance
of Farmers' Rights); KEYSTONE CENTER, MADRAS SESSION, supranote 8, at 9 (acknowledging

farmers' contributions in concept of Farmers' Rights).
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developing countries' domesticated varieties is not a gift of nature.
Instead, it is the product of millions of hours of human labor.
Notwithstanding their contributions, scientists are not the sole
producers of the utility embodied in commercial elite varieties. In
recognition of this concept, the Madras Session of the Keystone
Center noted that farmers' efforts
can aptly be described as an
78
system."
innovation
"informal
The developed countries' arguments rely on a Eurocentric,
individualistic understanding of property.79 This concept of
property ignores the collective labor of generations. Arguably, the
developed countries' concept rests on the assumption that plant
genetic resources have no value until individuals in industrial
countries incorporate their intellect into it. This Eurocentrism is
monocultural and disrespectful of other cultural perceptions of
property. Furthermore, this attitude focuses less on the purported
interests of mankind than on the interests of maintaining Western
hegemony in the control and utilization of plant genetic resources.
Such a position relies on the belief that European creative genius
recognized the greatness of developing country plant genetic
resources and bestowed upon these resources the exalted status of
"property," in contrast to their lowly former status as a common
heritage.' Applying a Eurocentric concept of property to plant
genetic resources implies that until plant genetic resources achieve
the status of property, these resources remain free for all.
Another argument advanced by the developed countries against
commoditization is that raw plant genetic resources cannot be
priced. Developed countries assert that until the raw genetic
resource is priced, it is of unknown quantity and value.81
Admittedly, the pricing of raw plant genetic resources presents
difficulties because the value of these resources is often latent.
Consequently, the value of wild germplasm may not be discerned

78 KEYSTONE CENTER, MADRAS SESSION, supra note

8, at 7.

" See generally Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1541-44

(1993) (introducing natural rights approach to intellectual property).
0o Cf. Coombe, supra note 38, at 257 (discussing transformation of "ethnographic
specimens" of tribal works into "art" by European recognition of their greatness).
"l See Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 23, at 188 (commenting on purported
distinction between utility of plant genetic resources and price placed on such utility).
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for many years." Focusing on the inability to price the wild
germplasm permits the value of the whole to mask the value of the
part. This inability does not vindicate the failure to assign value
to an item which is conceded and appreciated as having some
utility.
This pricing argument should not be used to preclude protection
of other forms of intellectual property. Pricing of the use of a new
song protected by copyright is ordinarily difficult. What is
beautiful music to one man might be a dreadful cacophony to
another. Yet, a minute number of notes and chords may receive
copyright protection, allowing a new song to enter the market and
subsequently be priced. Under this concept of intellectual property,
then, one could argue that the price of an object is neither a
necessary nor sufficient condition for protection. Why should
pricing be relevant when it comes to raw plant genetic resources?
One can trace the answer to this question to Eurocentrism, which
refuses to recognize an object as property unless it fits neatly into
certain conventional categories.
A final argument against commoditization of raw plant genetic
resources is that collection of germplasm does not result in any
deprivation to the source country. When sampling a plant population, collectors acquire only a few pounds of seed or plant matter,
leaving the vast bulk of material untouched. Thus, it is asserted,
unlike the extraction of other resources such as oil and minerals,
the extraction of plant genetic resources results in no significant
depletion of the resource itself.
On its face, this argument is air-tight. Its weakness lies in its
failure to recognize that in extractions involving minerals, timber
and allied resources, value is appropriated in direct proportion to
the volume of the resource extracted. With plant genetic resources,
however, the value of the whole is present in even minimal
amounts. By supplying plant genetic resources as a free good
without an exchange value, the donor country does not lose the
genetic information but does lose the opportunity to receive a
I For example, a collection of wild sugar beet was conducted in 1925 and 1935 in order
to obtain plants resistant to leaf spot disease. It remained unused until 1976 when it was
discovered that several accessions in the collection exhibited immunity to Rhyzomania, a
devastating root disease. CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL
RESEARCH, CGIAR FACT SHEET 6 1 (1992).
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reciprocal economic return for its contribution. Furthermore, the
aggregate amount of a specific plant genetic resource possessed by
a country is not the issue; rather, the issue is the distinct genetic
information extracted from a country without compensation.
Arguments against commoditization raised by developed
countries misrepresent the facts. The developing countries do not
allege an infringement of ideas gained from the study of germplasm, but rather the taking of the germplasm and its genetic
information. Without plant genetic resources from developing
countries, developed countries could not have produced improved
varieties. Although skills and efforts employed by a developed
country may modify plant genetic resources and enhance their
value, such "improvements" do not negate a taking of what belongs
to the developing countries.
The genetic information embodied in the plant genetic resources
is not fungible; it endures. Denying proprietary status to plant
genetic resources is tantamount to treating these resources as
fingible commodities. "Property that is merely fungible does not
receive any special protection."'
Consequently, developing
countries should secure compensation and share the profits from
research and products emanating from their plant genetic resources. Developing countries should follow this course not only because
their resources provide raw materials for new plant products, but
also because biological materials and science have developed into
businesses. Accordingly, their results no longer pass freely to all
scientists." The stampede to patent improved plant varieties
demonstrates this commercialization.'
No justification warrants
the exclusion of developing countries from participating in the
profits generated by use of their plant genetic resources.
The continued failure to commoditize plant genetic resources
while categorizing them as part of a common heritage of mankind
disguises the reality that international law reflects the geopolitical
balance of power. International law represents the triumph of a
Eurocentric individualistic concept of property, which ignores
John Moustakas, Note, Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict
Inalienability,74 CORNELL L REV. 1179, 1190 (1989).
" Patricia Orwen, The Invasion of the Gene Snatchers, TORONTO STAR, May 8, 1994, at
Fl.
wId.
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collective labor's role in the acquisition of property, over a grouporiented African concept of property rights. This geopolitical
balance drastically limits the options of developing countries and
places them in a weak position to fight uncompensated extraction
of their plant genetic resources.
The Prime Minister of Malaysia's statement at the 1992 Earth
Summit in Rio de Janeiro emotionally depicted this position:
The poor countries have been told to preserve their
forests and other genetic resources on the off-chance
that at some future date something is discovered
which might prove useful to humanity...
. We are
also told that the rich will not agree to compensate
the poor for their sacrifices. The rich argue that the
diversity of genes stored and safeguarded by the poor
are of no value until the rich through their superior
intelligence, release the potential within. It is then
an intellectual property and must be copyrighted and
protected .... The poor are not asking for charity.
When the rich chopped down their own forests ...

and scoured the world for cheap resources, the poor
said nothing. Indeed, they paid for the development
of the rich. Now, the rich claim a right to regulate
the development of the poor countries. And yet any
suggestion that the rich compensate the poor adequately is regarded as outrageous. As colonies, we
were exploited. Now, as independent nations, we are
to be equally exploited.'
Indian farmers have expressed similar sentiments:
if the hard-earned income of the people or the natural resources of any nation or region [is] ... plun-

dered... [and] the goods produced by them are paid
at arbitrarily determined prices while the goods
bought by them are sold at high prices ...

in order

"Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, at 230,
231, 233, U.N. Doe. AICONF.151/26/Rev.1 (vol. V) (1993) [hereinafter UNCED Report].
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to carry this process of economic exploitation to its
logical conclusion... then these are the7 indices of
slavery of that nation, region or people.8
Vandana Shiva laments this state of affairs:
Some people's germplasm becomes a finished commodity, a "product," [and] other people's germplasm
becomes a mere "raw" material for that product. The
manufacture of the "product" in corporate labs is
counted as production. The reproduction of the "raw"
material by nature and Third World farmers is mere
conservation. The "value added" in one domain is
built on the "value robbed" in the other domain.
Biotechnology development thus translates into
biodiversity erosion and poverty creation.'
The issue of which plant genetic resources should be the subject
matter of ownership and which resources should be freely accessible requires resolution. Before suggesting a framework for
resolving this issue, it is necessary to examine the extent to which
international efforts recommended at the Rio De Janeiro Earth
Summit in 1992 effectively address it.
IV. AGENDA 21 AND THE BIODiVERSITY CONVENTION
The 1992 Rio Earth summit produced three documents in
addition to the Biodiversity Convention and the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change." These documents
were: (1) Agenda 21, an 800-page collection of recommendations

0 VANDANA SHIVA, THE VIOLENCE OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION 186-87 (1991) (quoting
resolution
adopted at All Sikh Convention in April 1986) (citation omitted).
8
Id. at 254.
The objectives of the Biodiversity Convention are inter alia, the "conservation of
biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitablesharing
of the benefits arisingout of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate
access to genetic resources and by appropriatetransferof relevanttechnologies." Convention
on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 1, 31 I.LM. 822, 823 (emphasis added) [hereinafter
Biodiversity Convention].
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that nations should act upon to move towards sustainable development; (2) The Rio Declaration, a statement of twenty-seven basic
principles for environmentally sound development; and (3) a
statement of "forest principles" intended as a starting point for the
negotiation of an international agreement on forest protection.'O
This discussion will focus on provisions pertinent to ownership and
access to plant genetic resources in these documents.
Agenda 21 and the Biodiversity Convention furnish a framework
for regulation of plant genetic resources. These documents espouse
a principle vital to ownership of plant genetic resources-the
sovereign right of states over genetic resources found within their
borders. Under Agenda 21, states "have the sovereign right to
exploit their own biological resources pursuant to their environmental policies".9 ' Further, states have the duty to conserve diversity
and promote sustainable utilization of biological resources.'
Under the Biodiversity Convention, not only do states have
sovereign rights over their natural resources, but also "the
authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with the
national governments and is subject to national legislation."93 To
balance the interests of the scientific community and the source
state, the Biodiversity Convention commands states to "take
legislative, administrative or policy measures.., for sharing in a
fair and equitable way the results of research and development and
the benefits arising from the commercial... utilization of genetic
resources with the [source of] such resources."'
These provisions exhibit a reciprocity theory that countries which
sacrifice to conserve natural species, as well as countries whose
industries transform raw germplasm into useful products, should
be entitled to receive a portion of the profits from the sale of these

- Edith B. Weiss, IntroductoryNote to United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, 31 LL.M. 814 (1992); AGENDA 21 AND THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS passim
(Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1993).
91 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, at 103,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. H) (1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21].
" Biodiversity Convention, supra note 89, arts. 6, 8, 10, at 824.
Biodiversity Convention, supra note 89, art. 15, at 828.
"Id.
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products." The Convention thus disavows the notion that plant
genetic resources are a common heritage of mankind. The
Convention, however, gives states the right and responsibility of
governing their genetic resources in their relations with other
states and their inhabitants instead of recognizing the proprietary
rights in the genetic resources of a state."
Neither Agenda 21 nor the Biodiversity Convention explicitly
address the ownership of plant genetic resources. Instead, the
documents emphasize national obligations to conserve plant genetic
resources. In addition, the documents provide for access to plant
genetic resources and products thereof.
Under the Biodiversity Convention, access to, and transfer of,
technology (including biotechnology) to developing countries is to be
provided under "fair and most favorable terms.'
Where a
mutual agreement exists, this access and transfer may be on
"concessional and preferential terms."
In cases involving
patented technology and other intellectual property, "such access
and transfer shall be provided on terms which recognize and are
consistent with the adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights... [and] which are to be supportive of, and not to
run counter to the [convention's] objectives.""

u In the spirit of compensation, recent examples show corporations recognizing
entitlements in natural plant genetic resources. The pharmaceutical giant Merck has
implicitly acknowledged an obligation to compensate for the use of raw plant germplasm in
a much-publicized venture with the government of Costa Rica. Leslie Roberts, Chemical
Prospecting:Hope for VanishingEcosystems?, 256 SCIENCE 1142,1142 (1992). Merck agreed
to pay Costa Rica's National Institute of Biodiversity (INBio) an initial fee of $1 million to
undertake high-tech chemical prospecting in Costa Rica's rain forests, and will provide INBio
a percentage of the profits on any drugs derived from plants or microorganisms provided by
the Costa Rican researchers. Id. at 1143. The American Cancer Institute and Smith-Kline
Beecham have made similar arrangements in Cameroon and Ghana, respectively. Tom
Reynolds, Drug Firms, CountriesHope to Cash in on NaturalProducts, 84 J. NAT'L CANCER
INST. 1147, 1148 (1992). The National Science Foundation, the Agency for International
Development, and the National Institutes of Health, have begun a grant program designed
to foster conservation and compensation for plant genetic resources. Constance Holden,
Combining Economics with Biodiversity, 258 SCIENCE 551, 551 (1992).
"Frederick Hendrickx et al., Convention on Biological Diversity-.Access to Genetic
Resources: A Legal Analysis, 23 ENVFL POLVY & L, 250, 256 (1993).
" Biodiversity Convention, supra note 89, art. 16, at 829.
98
Id.
"Id.
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Developed countries, specifically the United States, have objected
to the access provisions of the Biodiversity Convention."°° The
United States asserts that the provisions are unacceptable to the
extent they imply that patents are only to be respected when they
do not prevent universal distribution of patented products. 10 ' The
United States argues that "fair and equitable" sharing is equivocal."° If a large number of countries found American patent laws
restrictive, they would probably hold these laws to be internationally unfair and invalid. Accordingly, the United States argues that
the Convention's language would permit countries to disregard
patent rights or to claim a share of the patent benefits derived from
products based upon their natural resources, even in the absence
o
of any royalty contract. 1°
Despite this interpretation, the U.S. disagrees only when the
Convention's text shifts from protecting biodiversity to actual
regulation of biotechnological results.' °4 When compensatory
entitlement is claimed for in situ'°5 raw genetic material, the
United States has no objection,"~ in effect conceding that the
concept is an imperfect concept for plant genetic
common heritage
0
resources. 7

During the 1992 Rio Earth Summit in Brazil, a bid by developing
countries to amend the Biodiversity Convention to address access

'00 Stone, supra note 26, at 1624.

Earth Conference: Biodivisive, ECONOMIST, June 13, 1992, at 93.
Margulies, supra note 1, at 337.
10
The Earth Conference: Biodivisive, supra note 101, at 93.
104Margulies, supra note 1, at 339.
105In situ genetic resources are those plant genetic resources found in their natural
habitat. In contrast, ex situ genetic resources are those removed from their natural habitat
and stored as seeds, tissue or pollen in field gene banks, or in other live collections.
I According to State Department officials, the United States agrees with the principle
that underdeveloped nations should be compensated for use of their genetic resources. Jane
Perlez, EnvironmentalistsAccuse U.S. of Trying to Weaken Global Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, May
19, 1992, at C4.
I Cf. Malcolm Gillis, Economics, Ecology, and Ethics: Mending the Broken Circle for
Tropical Forests, in ECOLOGY, ECONOMICS, ETHICS: THE BROKEN CIRCLE 155, 175 (F.
Herbert Bormann and Stephen R. Kellert eds., 1991) (offering joint financing and policy
reforms as solutions to freerider problem); Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 23, at 192
(stating common heritage doctrine may be detrimental).
101 The
10
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to ex situ germplasm collections and farmers' rights failed." s In
light of this failure, the Biodiversity Convention avoids addressing
the legal status of ex situ plant genetic resources. Consequently,
Genetic Resources Action International (GRAIN) has noted that
"the Biodiversity Convention is a 'small step forward in conservation' but a large step backward for Third World control over the
valuable international germplasm collection run by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)."V ""
Despite criticism from developing countries, Agenda 21 goes
further than the Biodiversity Convention in protecting in situ plant
genetic resources to the extent that it explicitly recognizes farmers'
rights and the role of indigenous people as "hav[ing] an historical
relationship with their lands ... ."2 Accordingly, states are
urged to "adopt ... appropriate policies ... that will protect

Agenda 21
indigenous intellectual and cultural property."1
sustainable
developapproach"
to
a
"farmer-centred
recommends
12
ment.2

Although it recognizes farmers' rights, Agenda 21 does not
acknowledge proprietary rights in plant genetic resources themselves. As the Prime Minister of Ethiopia has noted, the present
Convention falls short of comprehensively covering issues related
to use, ownership, funding and the transfer of technology developed
from biological resources.1 Echoing similar sentiments, a report
by GRAIN has concluded that the Biodiversity Convention is
extremely weak and even counter-productive in two respects.11 45
First, the door is opened for the patenting of genetic materials.
Second, the Convention excludes a crucial part of the world's

lUExclusion of CGIAR GermplasmBanks FromConvention on BiologicalDiversityRaises
Ire of Non-Governmental Organizations,DIVERSITY, voL 8, no. 3, at 5, 5 (1992) (discussing
failed attempt) (hereinafter CG/AR Exclusion].
Id. (citation omitted).
10
Agenda 21, supra note 91 (voL III), at 16.
...
Id. at 18.
ild. at 39.
1
UNCED Report, supra note 86, at 147.
114
CGIAR Exclusion, supra note 108, at 5.
1N5Id.
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biodiversity, ex situ plant genetic resources held in gene-banks.116
This exclusion has raised questions regarding the legal status of ex
situ plant genetic resources.
V. GENE BANKS AND PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES
One scholar estimates that over 2.5 million crop accessions are
held in gene banks throughout the world. 17 Most of these
accessions are wild and weedy "ancestral" species or "primitive"
cultivars of plant varieties; the source for modern elite commercial
plant varieties. Ownership of plant genetic resources that have
been collected in one country and preserved in the gene banks of
another, and possibly improved in yet another country presents a
legal problem."' Concern over the legal status of these resources
results from reports that certain countries or firms restrict the flow
plant genetic resources for political and commercial
of ex situ
119
reasons.
At issue are the plant genetic resources in gene banks controlled
by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
(CGIAR) 2° and IBPGR. Most of the collections controlled by the
IBPGR are in developed countries. Consequently, these countries,
which have limited diversity in plant genetic resources, have
accumulated large quantities of germplasm equivalent to those
found in developing countries. With respect to potato, wheat, and
food legumes, for example, developed countries have more germplasm in stored accessions than developing countries have in a
.'See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 89, art. 15, at 828 (defining countries which
provide "genetic resources" so as to exclude genebanks). Genetic resources stored in gene
banks or kept under ex situ conditions in a country and obtained before the Convention went
into effect are excluded from regulation and subject to treatment as the common heritage of
mankind. Hendrickx et al., supra note 96, at 251.
*7See DONALD L PLUNCKETT ET AL., GENE BANS AND THE WORLD'S FOOD 110 (1987)
(including over 1.2 million accessions of cereals; 369,000 accessions of food legumes; 215,000
accessions of forage legumes and grasses; 137,000 accessions of vegetables; and 74,000 clones
of root
11 crops).
1d. at 4.
1 8
' JUMA, supra note 4, at 200-01.
" CGIAR is an informal association of forty public and private sector donors supporting
a network of 16 international agricultural research centers, including IBPGR. CONSULTATIVE
GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH, CGIAR FACt SHEET 9, at 1 (1992)
[hereinafter FACT SHEET 9].
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natural diversity of these crops. 11 The wealthiest countries,
which contain the smallest and least interesting biotas, thus
preside over the largest collection of germplasm. Thus, the centers
of diversity have shifted from the natural systems of primitive
cultivars to gene banks. This situation attracts concern because no
specific legislation confers proprietary rights over the genetic
resources in these gene banks.'
Presently, the resources in the gene banks are recognized as part
of the common heritage of mankind. As such, they are freely
accessible to all scientific researchers and plant breeders. The
ownership of these resources, however, remains unclear." To
discern the legal status of these resources, one must resort to the
constitutive headquarter agreements establishing each of the
CGIAR gene banks.
While some
The organization of CGIAR centers varies.''
centers operate on a private contract basis, others function
according to more comprehensive arrangements involving international organizations and formal international law. The constitutive
instruments may be interpreted to give the host country rights to
a center's germplasm collection if the center is officially closed,
moved or shut down due to hostilities or natural disaster.m A
survey by IBPGR indicates that most centers hold their genetic
collections as part of the centers' assets and would be treated as
such on dissolution.'26 Therefore, the host governments own the
dissolution and could dispose of them without
collections upon
7
restriction."'

121 See, eg., Donald L Plunckett et al., Crop Germplasm Conservation and Developing
Countries, 220 SCiziCE 163, 165 (1983) (discussing disparity of germplasm resources
between developed and developing countries).
' See generally, David I. Downes, New Diplomacy for the Biodiversity Trade:
Biodiversity, Biotechnology, and Intellectual Property in the Convention on Biological
Diversity,4 TOURO J. TRANSNAAL L 1 (1993) (discussing uncertain treatment of proprietary
rights over seeds held in gene banks before Convention on Biological Diversity).
I= Wolfgang Siebeck & John Barton, The Implications of Applying the Legal Concept of
Trust to Germplasm Collections at CGIAR Research Centers, DIVERSTY, vol. 8, no. 3, at 29,
29 (1992).
See id. at 31 (outlining various legal arrangements under which centers operate).
"' Id. at 29.
m Id.
'" Id. at 29.30.
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Because the constitutive documents creating the gene banks are
legal instruments, unilateral revocation by founders or sponsors of
the centers cannot transpire. Dissolution of a center can occur only
by a decision of its members." 2 Members of these centers includes individuals, non-governmental organizations, and a few
donor-governments who control the collections. In most cases,
countries from which the specimens in the collections originate do
not have membership status. The 1988 CGIAR Technical Advisory
Committee report suggested that ownership of genebanks held by
the CGIAR centers is influenced partly by agreements with host
countries that vary among centers. 1" This diversity has several
significant ramifications.
First, although constitutive headquarter agreements permit the
host state to revoke these agreements, the act of revocation does
not affect the existence of the gene bank center. Rather, it affects
its right to reside in the host country. In addition to being
ineffective, revocation would violate the international legal concept
3°
of pacta sunt servanda."
Second, the CGIAR centers are "international only in a loose
sense because of their international support and objectives, and
their relative autonomy within their host countries." 1" They are
not international in the strict sense because they are not created by
formal treaty among states or other international legal persons,
and states or international persons do not direct their activities.
The legal status of these centers, and hence their collections of
plant genetic resources, is sui generis, neither national nor
international.

'Siebeck & Barton, supra note 123, at 31.
SId.
oSee H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW INTHE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 41883 (1933) (explaining principle of pacta aunt servanda); see also HANS KELSEN, THE PURE
THEORY OF LAW (1934), reprintedin LOUIS HENKIN ET AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND

MATERIALS 20 (1993) (discussingpacta aunt servanda as ability of states to regulate mutual
relations by treaty); accord Dotse A. Tsikata, Sovereign Borrowers, Foreign Creditors and
the Resolution of Sovereign Insolvency. A Legal Appraisal of Contemporary Practice 139
(1993) (unpublished SJD thesis, University of Toronto) (on file with author).
lMSiebeck & Barton, aupra note 123, at 31 (citing FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION [FAO], LEGAL STATUS OF BASE AND ACin COLCONS OF PLANT GENETIC
RESOURCES, FAO, Doc. CPGR/87/5 (1986)).
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Third, the legal status of the IBPGR is questionable."3 2 While
appreciating the scientific contributions of IBPGR, developing
countries have questioned its lack of juridical personality. 1 In
the creation and practices of these organizations, the control of
crops and conservation has passed from member governments of
the United Nations to a loose group of governments, scientists and
private foundations from developed countries.13 ' In this respect,
the IBPGR exists outside any form of international control. This
lack of international control has facilitated the transfer of plant
genetic resource from their centers of origin to the gene banks of
developed countries. "
This situation has illuminated the absence of clear mechanisms, other than moral suasion, for enforcing
the free exchange of plant genetic resources in the gene banks. 1"
Pursuant to the developing countries' concerns about IBPGR's
status, representatives of five governments signed an agreement
establishing an International Plant Genetic Resource Institute
(IPGRI) to replace IBPGR on October 9, 1991.137 This agreement

provides IPGRI with international status."s One of its objectives
is "to assist countries, particularly developing nations, to assess
and meet their needs for plant genetic resources conservation, and
to strengthen links with users"13 ' of these resources. The new
organization adopts the principle that plant genetic resources are
a common heritage of mankind and are freely accessible in the
public domain.1 "°
Notwithstanding the creation of this new organization, the key
question at the international level is whether the ownership of ex
situ plant genetic resources from developing countries should

KLOPPENBURG, supra note 22, at 172.
Id. at 172-73.
' JUMA, supra note 4, at 207 n.43 (asserting that creation of IBPGR has meant transfer
of control from United Nations member governments to ill-defined group of governments,
scientists, and private foundations).
u5Id.
KLOPPENBURO, supra note 22, at 172.
"' See FACr SHEET 9, supra note 120, at 1 (outlining establishment and objectives of
IPGRI).
I See id. (observing that IPGRI operations dependent upon ratification of Headquarters

Agreement by Italian Parliament).
UId. at 2.

,oKloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 23, at 173.
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continue to be viewed as a common heritage of mankind with free
access to researchers and plant breeders. In answering this
question, one must consider three categories of plant genetic
resources: (1) uncollected wild and natural plant genetic resources,
that is, in situ plant genetic resources; (2) wild and natural genetic
plant resources that may be stored in established gene banks in the
future; and (3) collected material already stored in established gene
banks, that is, ex situ plant genetic resources.
VI. OWNERSHIP OF IN SITU UNCOLLECTED WILD AND
NATURAL PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES

Contemporary international law characterizes plant genetic
resources as a common heritage of mankind. This characterization
insufficiently resolves the ownership of these resources. The
concept of common heritage has no legal application to plant
genetic resources found within the borders of a sovereign state and
should be abolished. The concept of national sovereignty provides
a better solution to the problem of ownership of plant genetic
resources.
As a precept of public international law, nation-states have
jurisdiction over all persons and things found within their territorial boundaries."" Accordingly, nation-states have the prerogative
to prevent all persons from interfering with things found within
their borders.142 Moreover, sovereign states have the right to
defend their territorial integrity and resources against external
interference.14
Agenda 21 and the Biodiversity Convention recognize these
rights. 1 "
Such recognition bolsters the argument that the
concept of a common heritage of mankind has no legal foundation
for application to plant genetic resources. As Li Peng, the Prime
Minister of China, asserted, "each country enjoys sovereign rights

"1 Seegenerally Louis HENKIN

ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1051-

86 (1993) (discussing bases of, and limits on, jurisdiction).
142 Id.

143
1

Id.

" Agenda 21, supra note 91 (vol. M1), at 16; Biodiversity Convention, supra note 89, art.
15, at 828.
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over its natural resources and biological species."14
Developing countries support this argument. At the Earth
Summit in Brazil, President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda
stated that:
I am pleased that a compromise has emerged on the
biological diversity issue. I had a major problem
because I heard that some people were trying to say
that forests in Uganda belong to the whole world; I
was not going to accept that. I have heard that an
agreement has been reached that the forests in
Uganda belong to Uganda and that if someone wants
to come and use those forests, he must get a licence
from us and we will share the profits. That is a
great relief to me, because I was going to oppose this
- there was no doubt.1"
President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania espoused similar
sentiments:
Most of us in developing countries find it difficult to
accept the notion that biodiversity should be considered the common heritage of mankind while the flow
of biological products from the industrial countries is
patented, expensive and considered the private
property of the firms that produce them. This
reflects the inequality of opportunity and
asymmetry
147
is unjust.
At the same meeting, President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya expressed his concerns:
We also believe in the right of nations to exploit and
trade in a sustainable and responsible manner the
natural resources found within their legal bound148

UNCED Report, 8upra note 86, at 36.
Id. at 24.
147
Id. at 189.
1
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aries. In the same vein, we feel that the natural
resources located outside the legal boundaries of any
country, including those located in the outer space
and in the high seas, are to be treated as mankind's
common heritage.'"
This Article suggests that after abrogating the concept of common
heritage of mankind and taking control of its genetic resources,
individual states can legislate the terms and conditions of access to
their genetic resources. The Biodiversity Convention provides for
such action, permitting states "to take legislative ... measures, " 149 provided that remuneration arrangements reflect "a fair
and equitable "i" sharing of the results of research and royalties
arising from any patented invention. It is unclear what would
constitute "fair and equitable" sharing in this context."5 ' Developing countries should enact a "Genetic Resources Access and
Remuneration Act" to abolish the concept of common heritage of
mankind with respect to plant genetic resources under their
national sovereignty.
In abjuring the concept of common heritage, one must note that
any stringent restrictions on collection and research of germplasm
might impede the utilization of wild plant genetic resources. This
delay would have serious ramifications for biotechnology research
because few developing countries have the requisite scientific
resources and fiscal wherewithal to undertake such research
unaided." 2 Moreover, even an agreement on access to, and
remuneration for, plant genetic resources may not, in practice,
work in favor of developing countries. Such agreements cannot
ensure equitable outcomes when the parties have unequal bargaining power due to transaction-specific failures, such as when a
developing country is overborne by economic pressures or lacks

1 1d. at

101.
Biodiversity Convention, supra note 89, art. 15, at 828.

50Id.

, Margulies, supra note 1, at 337.
" See Otto H. Frankel, Genetic Resources: Evolutionary and Social Responsibilities,in
SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 19, 39
(Jack R. Kloppenburg Jr. ed., 1988) (noting dearth of qualified scientists in developing
countries).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol2/iss1/4

30

Odek: Bio-piracy: Creating Proprietary Rights in Plant Genetic Resource

1.994]

BIO-PIRACY

sufficient technical information to assess its own interest.
A moral code of conduct for collectors of plant accessions should
also be considered. The Keystone Madras Session noted that
"germplasm collection ... should be carried out under an acceptable ethical code and include procedures such as the explicit
advanced clearance by the concerned country and sharing the
collected material and information about the material with the host
country."1 ' Such a code would prohibit unscrupulous practices
such as one documented by the Rural Advancement Foundation
International (RAFI), in which plant collector Clive Francis of
Australia "violated his contract by pocketing lucerne (alfalfa) seed
he was sent to study in North Africa, and returning to Australia,
now claims the seeds are 'worth millions' to [that] country's
livestock industry."1 "
What do developing countries stand to gain from the abolition of
the concept of a common heritage? First, abolishing the concept
commoditizes plant genetic resources and thus treats them the
same as the elite commercial varieties under intellectual property
laws. This equality of treatment achieves equity in the categorization of plant genetic resources of developed and developing
countries.
Second, abolition of the concept of common heritage is more
feasible than de-commoditization of the elite commercial varieties
of the developed countries. Abolition of the common heritage
concept requires only legislative action on the part of the governments of developing countries. This action acknowledges the
reality that multinational plant breeding firms will not readily
accept the de-commoditization of the elite commercial varieties,
which they consider corporate assets.
Third, eradication of the common heritage concept would amount
to a recognition of proprietary rights and the creation of a compensatory mechanism for plant genetic material coming from developing countries. Such achievements would rectify a substantial
imbalance in economic power between the advanced industrial

KEYSTONE CENTER, MADRAS SESSION, supra note 8, at 9.

The Benefits ofBiodiversity: 100+ Examples of the South's Contributionto the North's
Development through Rural Communities, RAFI COMMUNIQUE (Rural Advancement Found.
Int'l, Ottawa, Ontario), at 2.
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nations and the developing countries. 1" Recognizing that most
developing countries that are rich in plant genetic resources are
also relatively poor in biotechnology, commoditization of plant
genetic resources will enrich these states by permitting exportation
of these resources to locations where they are valued according to
free market principles. 1" The nation or its citizens will receive
returns from the export of plant genetic resources. In this regard,
Kloppenburg and Kleinman note that it is better to receive revenue
from exports than never to receive any money at all.' 57
Fourth, declaring plant genetic resources as the property of the
state in which they are located produces a positive impact on
biodiversity preservation. 1" National governments could entertain claims by their farmers, finders and corporations, use all
proceeds from licenses for the collective benefit of their citizens, or
set up a large system of village-level landrace custodians whose
a limited sample of endanpurpose would be to continue to grow
15
gered landraces native to the region. 9
VII. OWNERSHIP OF WILD AND NATURAL PLANT GENETIC
RESOURCES TO BE STORED IN GENE BANKS N THE FUTURE

This Article has asserted that abrogation of the concept of
common heritage will make plant genetic resources national
property. National law pertaining to transfer, alienation, and
disposition of property should be applicable to this process. Based
on this assumption, access to and utilization of plant genetic
resources should occur by contract between the state or its
authorized agent and the acquiring party (gene-bank) or its
authorized agent. The storage of genetic resources collected from
the wild and natural species should also occur on a contractual
I See Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 23, at

195 (suggesting additional solutions

to "plant germplasm controversy).
's But cf Coombe, supra note 38, at 261 (objecting to argument, in context of cultural
objects, that price determines value).
' 61 Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 23, at 195.
SSee. Roger A. Sedjo, Property Rights and the Protection of Plant Genetic Resources, in
SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOuRCES 293, 30809 (Jack R. Kloppenburg Jr. ed., 1988) (discussing potential outcomes from such declaration).
I Miguel A. Altieri & Laura C. Merrick, Acroecology and In Situ Conservationof Native
316, 362 (Edward 0. Wilson ed., 1988).
rITY
Crop Diversity in the Third World, in BIODIVE
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basis between the same parties. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
abolition of the concept of common heritage of mankind does not
address the fundamental question of ownership of plant genetic
resources currently stored in gene banks.
VIII. OWNERSHIP OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES ALREADY
STORED IN GENE BANKS

Before considering solutions to the ownership question of plant
genetic resources, it is important to discuss the view of CGIAR,
which controls most of the gene banks. In 1989, CGIAR stated that
its policy is "that collections assembled as a result of international
collaboration should not become the property of a single nation, but
should be held in trust for use of present and future generations of
research workers in all countries throughout the world."'60 Once
a country has collaborated in the collection of the plant genetic
resources, any exclusive ownership right to the collected material
terminates."' 1 The materials are then held by the CGIAR centers
in trust for all people.
Siebeck and Barton hold a similar view, that base material
(unimproved material) in gene banks should be held in trust
regardless of who is the formal legal owner." This reflects an
underlying notion of a common heritage of mankind. These
advocates state that "the CGIAR centers, as trustees, are obligated
to maintain the germplasm carefully and must ensure that it is
widely available for plant breeding."'"
In order to resolve the ownership of plant genetic resources
presently stored in gene banks, this Article adopts Siebeck and
Barton's position, minus the common heritage concept. CGIAR
centers should hold germplasm collections in trust, not for the
benefit of researchers, but for the benefit of the country in whose
territory the germplasm was collected. Access to this genetic
material should be subject to the payment of adequate compensation by the research community.
1

Siebeck & Barton, supra note 123, at 32.
m Id. at 31.
1m
Id.
lId.

'"Id.at 33-34.
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What would be the legal status of the germplasm currently stored
in the gene banks? Annulment of the concept of common heritage
implies that countries from which plant genetic resources were
collected have not renounced their proprietary rights over the
material; these countries have merely transferred possession of
their plant germplasm to the CGIAR centers. Therefore, states
should retain sovereign proprietary rights over the germplasm in
gene banks.'
Implementation of this position would encounter three difficulties. First, it could create a situation in which developing countries
become competing suppliers of plant genetic resources, compounding primary commodity problems already present in the contemporary international trade arena.'" Second, given the nature of the
stored genetic material, the proposal requires isolation and
determination of the country from which a particular germplasm
originated. Currently, documentation does not exist for all
germplasm stored in gene banks."l 7 Further, no uniform system
indicates the origin of each sample, nor details of structural or
chemical composition sufficient to correlate collected samples. 1 8"
Third, the proposal retroactively abolishes the concept of a common
heritage. In practice, retroactivity meets with disfavor because it
may raise legal difficulties in dealing with rights previously
acquired under the common heritage concept.

" In this respect, scientists and researchers would gain access to these materials subject
to agreement that any research results generated by use of the material so obtained shall
be subject to compensatory and royalty provisions for the benefit of the country in whose
territory the material was collected.
' Primary products, especially agricultural commodities, have recently been subjected
to fluctuating prices and declining demand owing to competition from synthetic fibers.
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT - PovERTY 13 (1990). Even when the demand
for agricultural produce is high, the supply has not been able to respond immediately as
there is a time lag involved in the production of agricultural produce. Id.
' Cf David Wood, Crop Germplasm: Common Heritageor FarmersHeritage?,in SEEDS
AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 275, 282 (Jack

R. Kloppenburg Jr. ed., 1988) (suggesting necessary changes to current germplasm storage
and documentation procedures).
lmId. at 282.
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DX. VESTING OF PLANT GENETIC PROPERTY RIGHTS:
STATE, INDIVIDUAL OR ANOTHER ENTITY?

One of the initial problems confronting commoditization of plant
genetic resources is the determination of which entity qualifies for
proprietary rights in natural, discovered, or protected plant species.
Approximately three billion people in the world farm; perhaps
property entitlements should reward their efforts in the collection,
improvement, and conservation of these genetic resources.
Indigenous peoples may also possess valid claims to property rights
through their knowledge of the plant materials in their environments. The nation-state, by virtue of sovereignty, may also hold a
legitimate stake in proprietary rights. The question of which
competing entities should have the proprietary rights remains.
This question is important because the law of property, besides
imposing duties, provides distributively for the individual or entity
who holds property rights-every right has a holder and rights
cannot exist without a right holder.169 Commoditization of rights
in plant genetic resources affects the distribution and control of
these resources. These proprietary rights reflect the way in which
rights serve as norms for distribution between the right holder and
the non-right holder. At the outset, two entities are candidates for
the vesting of plant genetic property rights: nation-states and
individuals.170 Various scholars throw their weight behind one or
the other. This Article proposes a third possible candidate-the
group or community.
Jack Kloppenburg and Daniel Kleinman support the idea that
the nation-state is a viable entity in which to vest plant genetic
property rights."" They note that national sovereignty over plant
genetic resources points to one inescapable conclusion: "[the third
world countries] have a great deal to gain through international
acceptance of the principle that plant genetic resources constitute

16

CARL WEmaN, A THEORY OF RIGHTS 189-195 (1985).
See Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 23, at 199 (supporting view that nation-state

is appropriate entity in which to vest plant genetic resource property rights); but see Wilkes,
supra note 6, at 84-85 (rejecting Kloppenburg and Kleinman's theory because it privatized
longstanding public good).
' Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 23, at 194.
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a form of national property."172 The establishment of this principle would provide a framework through which developing countries
would receive compensation for the appropriation and use of their
plant genetic resources.
A nuisance inherent in using sovereignty as the basis for vesting
plant genetic resources is the inefficiency and bureaucracy attendant to state ownership. Moreover, state ownership centralizes all
plant resources and decisions about their use. Consequently,
resources and provide access through
bureaucrats manage precious
173
bureaucratic allocations.
A competing candidate for the vesting of proprietary rights in
plant genetic resources is the individual. A Eurocentric conception
arguably predicates property on free enterprise and individual
ownership. Consequently, commoditization must necessarily vest
in an individual and not in a nation-state. This individualism
entails decentralization, delegating ownership of plant genetic
resources to many individuals who have substantial (although not
absolute) power to manage and control their use and disposition.
Central to this perspective is the property concept of wide-scale
ownership where resources are widely owned in small
small-share
174
amounts.

This Article suggests the possibility of abandoning not only the
notion of nation-state ownership, but also the concept of individual
ownership of plant genetic resources. In so doing, it examines
entities in African customary society that could be made "persons"
under international law, and thereby vested with plant genetic
property rights. Assuming these entities exist, what is their nature
and are they appropriate owners of property rights in plant genetic
resources? An analysis of customary African practices related to
land lends insight into the nature of these groups and communities.
In customary African land law, the notion of individual ownership is alien. As a general rule, customary practice bases ownership of land on groups and communities as land-owning entities.
An individual enjoys rights in land as a member of the land-owning

1

Id.
Joseph W. Singer & Jack M. Beermann, The Social Origins of Property, 6 CAN. J.L.
217, 241 (1993).
& JURISPRUDENCE
114
Id. at 242.
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unit. 1 5 To perform its tasks, the group acts through an agent,
namely the chief, the village head, or the clan leader.'"

Custom-

ary practice regards the chief as the symbol of the residuary,
reversionary, and ultimate ownership of all land held by the
community. 1" In this sense, the chief is a trustee. 78
This Article proposes vesting proprietary rights to plant genetic
resources in such customary groups and communities. This
proposal, however, entails recognition that the concept of promoting
the community's general welfare provides an important justification
for holding cultural property inalienable. 17 9 The necessity of
inalienability stems primarily from future generations' inability to
consent to transactions that threaten their existence as a group.
The belief that commoditization and fungibility are inappropriate
ways to treat constitutive elements of grouphood and are inimical
to communal development bolsters the need for inalienability." °
Conceding that this concept of grouphood is pertinent to ownership of plant genetic resources, this Article does not endorse
inalienability of plant genetic resources. Instead, it endorses
commoditization and alienability of plant genetic resources as
valuable objects of trade that contribute to the well-being of all
peoples. If plant genetic resources are made inalienable, no
reallocation of resources to more valuable applications would be
possible. ' If one recognizes that the countries that are rich in
plant genetic resources have no technological and fiscal wherewith-

5
"a
Max Gluckman, PropertyRights and Status in African TraditionalLaw, in IDEAS AND
PROCEDURES
INAFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 252, 252 (Max Gluckman ed., 1969).
17

A.N.Allott, Legal Personalityin African Law, in IDEAS AND PROCEDURES IN AFRICAN

CUSTOMARY LAW 179, 191 (Max. Gluckman ed., 1969).
n Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria, 1921 App. Cas. 399, 404 (appeal taken
from Nig.).
8 The use of the word "trustee in the African land holding differs from its ordinary
English meaning. In English law, a trustee is the legal owner of the property and is bound
to administer the trust property on behalf of the beneficiaries. See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY
1684 (4th ed. 1951) (defining trustee). In customary African law, the chief was bound to
control the land belonging to the group for the benefit of the members of the community. It
is only in this respect that their position resembled that of a trustee. The headman had
control but not ownership of the land. In this respect, his position was more like that of an
agent. T"ani, 1921 App. Cas. at 404-05.
17 9

Moustakas, aupra note 83, at 1185.

"'Id.at 1210-1211.
181RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.1, at 34 (4th ed. 1992).
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al to utilize the resources, then making resources inalienable is
tantamount to hoarding a valuable resource to humanity's detriment.
What are the reasons for the vesting of plant genetic property
rights in these group entities rather than in the individual or the
nation-state? First, taking into account that traditional groups and
communities have, over many generations, conserved and preserved
the plant genetic resources, it follows that these groups deserve a
proprietary reward for their conservation efforts. Furthermore, it
is easier to vest such property rights in the group rather than in
individual members of these groups because it is difficult to isolate
individuals who contributed to the conservation or preservation of
these resources. In addition to this practical consideration, it is
appropriate to vest property rights in the various indigenous groups
because no single individual singlehandedly preserved and
conserved the plant genetic resources.
Second, vesting property rights in such groups is preferable to
vesting them in the nation-state. The geographical sizes of various
African countries and the drawing of their national boundaries
without due regard to anthropological considerations makes the
African nation-state an inappropriate entity in which to vest these
proprietary rights. Groups living in a certain climatic region
should be responsible for undertaking the conservation and
preservation of plant genetic resources in that region. Members of
these groups should exercise property rights in the resources
present in their localities because equity demands that each person
be rewarded according to his efforts.
Benefits stemming from a plant variety preserved by communities in particular regions should not accrue to communities that
never participated in its preservation and conservation, even
though these communities may be found within the same country.
Theoretically, no difference exists between such other communities
and foreign countries. One may perceive each group or community
"as an author who originates a culture from resources that come
from within and thus lays claim to exclusive possession of the
expressive works that embody its personality."1" 2

' Coombe, supra note 38, at 264.
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In addition, vesting plant genetic resources in groups permits the
group to take control of its own destiny because it allows the
possession of the plant genetic resources in the context in which
they were nurtured, preserved, and rendered useful to humanity.
This position mirrors policies found in historic preservation law,
which "recognizes group interest in property for the purposes of
developing a sense of community,"'m focusing on the propinquity
of plant genetic resources to the group that nurtured them. This
perspective squarely places plant genetic resources under the
Convention on the Means of Prohibitingand Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of CulturalProperty.'"
Under this Convention, plant genetic resources come within the
definition of "cultural property," rare collections and specimens of
flora relating to history.'18
An additional argument supporting vesting of plant genetic
property rights in groups stems from the relationship of these
resources to the environment. Plant genetic resources are similar
to cultural property, associated with the group or community that
has nurtured them. This association is a human-environment
symbiosis, a relationship between a thing and its context. Ethnobotany should thus determine ownership of the resources, vesting
ownership in the group or communities that cared for the resources. Assigning ownership of plant genetic resources in this manner
assures sensitivity to both the nuances of the particular historical
situation in which the claim to these resources arises and the
distinctive needs of the groups involved. This "call to context is a
call to consider the structures of power in society" ' 8 that nurtured and preserved the plant genetic resources. Moreover,
justification for vesting proprietary rights to plant genetic resources
for groups finds support in the idea that groups have intrinsic

Moustakas, supra note 83, at 1193.
See Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export,
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (adopting
historic preservation model).

'" In Article 1, the Convention defines cultural property to include: "(a) r]are collections
and specimens offauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and objects of palaeontological interest;
(b) property relating to history, including the history of science and technology .... Id. at
234.
*' Coombe, supra note 38, at 270 (citation omitted).
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rights and "that these rights often are intertwined with groups'
relations to history and objects .... "187
Vesting property rights to plant genetic resources in groups and
communities encounters a difficulty attributable to human mobility.
When individual members of groups and communities move and
intermingle with other communities, it becomes difficult to identify
the specific communities that conserved and preserved the plant
genetic resources in question. This flexibility of group boundaries
and subsequent difficulty in ascertaining members of the group
should not prevent discussion of vesting proprietary rights in
groups. Furthermore, one commentator observes that deciding
specific disputes among rival group claimants requires "a vibrant
conception of group rights.""e
Arguably, the vesting of property rights in groups and communities will promote conservation of biodiversity, providing economic
incentives to conserve and protect areas in which unknown but
potentially valuable species are located.'.. However, the converse
is also true. Vesting proprietary rights in groups implies that,
theoretically, every individual member of the group owns plant
genetic resources, while in reality, no one does. Just as with the
concept of a common heritage of mankind, little or no incentive
exists, save for altruism, to incur costs to conserve and protect
unique and endangered species.
An arguable flaw in vesting plant genetic resources in groups is
its potential impact on the incentive to advance biotechnological
innovations. Proponents of a European, individualistic concept of
property could contend that the prospect of monopoly returns and
economic rent accruing to an individual is a strong incentive for
innovation in biotechnology. Consequently, vesting plant genetic
property rights in the group may undermine this economic
incentive and limit advances in biotechnology. This argument is
fallacious because groups and communities in Africa and other
developing countries preserved and nurtured these resources in the
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past without monetary incentives.1" Furthermore, no conclusive
empirical evidence exists showing a positive correlation between
economic incentives, existence of breeders' protection, and advances
in biotechnology.
Thus, it is apparent that international law has yet to develop an
acceptable formula to resolve the issue of ownership of ex situ plant
genetic resources. It is time for international law to positively
address this issue. In relation to in situ resources, the Biodiversity
Convention marks a discernible evolution of international legal
standards in its recognition that nations exercise sovereign rights
over plant genetic resources within their borders and deserve to
share in the benefits accruing from the exploitation of these
resources. The Convention rejects the orthodox classification of
plant genetic resources as a common heritage of mankind. By
adopting an approach that recognizes intellectual property entitlements both in discovered and protected natural plant germplasm,
the Convention heralds a new direction for analyzing plant genetic
resources under international law.
For developing countries, given the difficulties of utilizing an
individualistic conception of property to claim a share of profits
emanating from their valuable plant genetic resources, it may well
be time for these countries to salvage the ethnobotanical information on their plant breeding and selection activities. Such action
will fortify their case for selection and preservation of plant genetic
resources and thus furnish a solid basis for claiming proprietary
rights over plant genetic resources.

m' Margery L. Oldfield & Janis B. Alcorn, The Coneervation of TraditionalAgroecosystems, BIOSCIENCE, Mar. 1987, at 199, 201.
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